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FROM NATIONAL CREDIT UNIONADMINISTRATION V FIRST
NATIONAL BANK & TRUST TO THE REVISED FEDERAL CREDIT
UNION ACT: THE DEBATE OVER MEMBERSHIP
REQUIREMENTS IN THE CREDIT UNION INDUSTRY
I. INTRODUCTION
For nearly a century, credit unions, the newest and smallest partici-
pants in our nation's financial system, have played an important role in
bringing financial services to the average American.1 Their image has
been particularly unsophisticated, 2 traditionally offering only the most
basic savings products to low net-worth customers, such as passbook
savings accounts and holiday club accounts. 3 On the lending side, credit
unions used to be known for lending in such low denominations that
other financial institutions would not consider these loans either profit-
able or worth their time. But the credit union industry, on the whole, has
"matured" and expanded substantially over the past few decades.5 Credit
unions are now poised to seriously and effectively compete with other
more-established financial intermediaries.
The credit union's increased ability to compete has not come without
costs. 7 For nearly a decade, credit unions and other financial intermedi-
1. See KERRY COOPER AND DONALD R. FRASER, BANKING DEREGULATION AND THE
NEW CoMPETIION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 10 (Ballinger Publishing Co. 1984).
2. See HERMAN E. KROoS AND MARTIN R. BLYN, A HISTORY OF FINANcIAL
INTERMEDIARIES 122 (Random House 1971).
3. See generally ALAN GART, REGULATION, DEREGULATION, REREGULATION: THE
FUTURE OF TE BANKING, INSURANCE, AND SECURITIES INDusTms 14 (John Wiley &
Sons 1994) (discussing the early business activities of banks, thrifts, and brokerage
houses).
4. See KROOS & BLYN, supra note 2, at 122.
5. See Caroline Wilson, Credit Union Battle Update, AMERICA'S COMMUNITY
BANKER, Feb. 1998, at 16; see also Linda Greenhouse, Credit Union Lose To Banks In
High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1998, at DI.
6. See Kenneth Gilpin, Piggy Banks With Muscles; As Credit Unions Boom, Fi-
nancialRivals CryFoul, N.Y. TMEs, Feb. 26, 1997, at D1.
7. See generally American Banking: Unco-operative, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 11,
1997, at 99-102 (discussing the fact that as cooperative financial institutions grew larger
and more competitive, other financial institutions have taken issue).
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aries have been embroiled in a fierce debate.8 This debate centers pri-
marily on certain statutorily-granted advantages unique to the credit un-
ion" corporate form, that permit credit unions to compete in ways many
feel are unfair to other, more-heavily-regulated financial intermediaries.9
This Note generally discusses the credit union industry in America,
as well as the debate over and impact of credit union membership re-
quirements. Part II of this Note provides an overview of the credit union
industry in the United States and looks at the history and development of
the industry, the regulatory framework established to oversee the credit
union industry, and the current prominence of credit unions in America.
This section also discusses the pertinent economic and competitive ad-
vantages credit unions have obtained. Part III explores the background
of and current debate over credit union membership requirements. Part
IV analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in National Credit Union Ad-
ministration v. First National Bank & Trust,10 the Court's most recent,
potent, and potentially damaging decision from February of 1998. Part
IV(A) hypothesizes about the potential effects the Court's ruling in Na-
tional Credit Union Administration would have had on the credit union
industry had Congress not stepped in. Part IV(b) argues that the Su-
preme Court should have afforded more deference to the National Credit
Union Administration's ("NCUA") policy interpretation of the member-
ship issue. Finally, Part V discusses recent amendments to the Federal
Credit Union Act as imposed by Congress' H.R. 1151;" how these
amendments cure any problems created by the Court's ruling in National
Credit Union Administration,12 and the effects this revised legislation
may have on the industry.
8. See generally National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
118 S.Ct. 927, 930-31 (1998) (rejecting the basis for plaintiff's claims); See also Dean
Foust Clipping the Wings of Credit Unions, Bus. WK., Aug. 26, 1996, at 5 6-57.
9. See Dean Foust Clipping the Wings of Credit Unions, Bus. WK., Aug. 26,
1996, at 56-58.
10. 118 U.S. 927 (1998).
11. See generally H.R. 1151, 105th Congress (1998).
12. 118 U.S. 927 (1998).
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II. AN OVERVIEW AND HISTORY OF THE CREDIT UNION INDUSTRY
Credit unions, which were originally developed in Germany, 13 first
appeared in the United States in the early twentieth century.14 They are
cooperative15 not-for-profit16 institutions in that each person, upon join-
ing the credit union by establishing a savings account or drawing a loan,
must pay a small entrance fee.17 Customers are referred to as "members"
of the institution.1
Credit unions have historically been characterized, in general, as
taking a conservative, lending-oriented approach to their operations. 19
This approach did much to promote the growth and expansion of credit
unions throughout the early part of the twentieth century.2 ° In 1922,
credit union funds accounted for only 11 million dollars in assets, or
.016% of the total funds held by all financial intermediaries. 21 Surpris-
ingly, from 1931-1933, during the worst years of the Great Depression,
the credit union industry actually continued to grow. - By 1933, credit
unions held, in approximately 2,000 institutions, 40 million dollars in
funds.
23
Greater stability was required in the financial industry.24 The stock
market crash in the late 1920's,25 staggering unemployment,26 and the
failure of many financial institutions27 contributed to this need. The
credit unions' small-scale lending practices, suggestion of systematic
13. See KRoos & BLYN, supra note 2, at 124.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 123.
16. See JAMEs B. LUDTKE, THE AMEmiCAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM: MARKERs AND
INSTITUTIONS 305 (Allyn and Bacon 1967).
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See generally KROOS & BLYN, supra note 2, at 122-24 (discussing the growth
of the credit union industry in America).
20. See id.
21. See idat 122.
22. See id. at 193.
23. See id.
24. See GART, supra note 3, at 14.
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savings, aggressive advertisement, competitive rates, and an image of a
home-town, personable, helpful institution, served the American public
well.28
Growth in the credit union industry did not end with demise of the
Great Depression.29 During the decades to follow, credit union member-
ship and the complexity of the services offered to their members contin-
ued to rise exponentially.30 Although in 1945, there were 8,683 credit
unions in the United States holding 435 million dollars in funds,31 by
1966, this was increased to 23,000 institutions holding more than 11.5
billion dollars in funds. 32 In 1988, assets increased throughout approxi-
mately 15,700 institutions to 196 billion dollars.33 Today, credit unions
continue to grow in number and popularity.
34
The services and products offered by credit unions used to be fairly
simple and traditional.35 They offered various types of savings accounts,
and made simple mortgage, consumer, and personal loans.36 Today,
however, credit unions have much more to offer their members. Their
menus have expanded significantly and are fully competitive with many
savings and commercial banking institutions.37 For example, credit un-
ions now provide to their members investment and financial planning
services; ATM, debit and credit cards; retirement funds, checking ac-
38counts, money orders, and travelers checks; and wire transfer services.
Notably, there has been a marked increase in the number of credit unions
entering the auto leasing arena.39
28. See KROOS & BLYN, supra note 2, at 122-24.
29. Seeid. at241.
30. See id. at 242.
31. Seeid. at241.
32. See id. at 242.
33. See MONA J. GARDNER AND DIXIE L. MILLS, MANAGING FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 318 (Dryden Press 1991).
34. See Joan Goldwasser, Bank Beating Deals at Credit Unions, KIPLINGER'S
PERSONAL FINANCE MAGAZINE, Oct. 1995, at 62.
35. See GART, supra note 3, at 14.
36. See LUDTKE, supra note 16, at 307.
37. See generally GARDNER & MILLS, supra note 33, at 316 (discussing the variety
of services offered by modem credit unions).
38. See id.
39. See Nicole Biondi, CREDrr REPORT: AGGRESSIVE TACTICS: GROWTH OF AUTO




The variety of services and products offered to consumers increases
as the size of the credit union increases.40 Generally speaking, the larger
the credit union, the more sophisticated the products offered will be.
41
Also, the converse of this is generally true.42 The majority of credit un-
ions in existence today are of the smaller type.
43
Credit unions are restricted from accessing traditional capital mar-
kets.44 Unlike savings and loans, savings banks, and commercial banks, a
credit union cannot raise capital by issuing debt or equity securities45
Consequently, credit unions operate in the most traditional means, col-
lecting savings funds from members' accounts and distributing them in
the form of interest-earning loans and other investments.46 A credit un-
ion's "earnings," which are typically interest rather than fee-based, 47 are
either reinvested into the institution or distributed to the members in the
form of a dividend.48
A number of governmental and industry-supported organizations
exist to regulate, facilitate, and insure credit unions.49 The NCUA, and
particularly the National Credit Union Administration Board ("the
Board") are broadly empowered by the Federal Credit Union Act5 to
both interpret the Act and regulate the industry.51 In particular, the
Board's powers include, but are not limited to, prescribing rules to ad-
minister the Federal Credit Union Act52 and to "suspend or revoke char-
40. See GARDNER & MILLS, supra note 33, at 315-17.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See GARDNER & MILLS, supra note 33, at 315 (stating that approximately 60
percent of all the credit unions in the United States have less than 5 million dollars in
assets).
44. See id. at 314-17.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 319-20.
48. See id.
49. See GARDNER & MILLS, supra note 33 at 315-16.
50. See generally Federal Credit Union Act § 102, 12 U.S.C. § 1752(a) (1998)
(discussing the composition, purpose, and powers of the National Credit Union Admini-
stration and the National Credit Union Administration Board).
51. See id.
52. See id. at § 1766(a).
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ters [of individual credit unions] ... for violating the provisions of its
charter, its bylaws, this chapter, or any regulations issued thereby."
53
The NCUA established numerous organizations to promote effi-
ciency and safety for the credit union industry:54 For example, the Na-
tional Credit Union Share Insurance Fund operates in a similar fashion to
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and provides deposit insur-
ance to the industry.56 Additionally, liquidity, which is the cash neces-
sary to meet day-to-day operations, is provided by the Central Liquidity
Facility.5 7 Other independent trade associations, which provide services
such as operational support, management advice, industry information
and statistics, and up-to-date relevant news, are the Credit Union Na-
tional Association, the Corporate Credit Union Network, and the U.S.
Central Credit Union.
58
Credit unions have other advantages over savings and commercial
banks. Since credit unions are not-for-profit institutions, they enjoy tax
advantages and cost-savings that are not available to other financial in-
termediaries.59 For example, credit unions are exempt from all state, lo-
cal, and federal income taxes.60 They need not pay income taxes to the
state, federal, or local government on any amount of income they real-
ize.
61
This tax-exempt status becomes a very powerful, competitive tool
when compared to the corporate tax rates that burden other financial in-62
termediaries. It allows credit unions, generally, to provide higher rates
53. Id. at § 1766(b)(1).
54. See, e.g., id. at § 1783(a); See, e.g., id. at § 1795(b) (discussing the establish-
ment of the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund and the Central Liquidity Facil-
ity to promote industry operations).
55. See EMMANUEL N. ROUsSAKIs, COMMERCIAL BANKING IN AN ERA OF
DEREGULATION 237-38 (Praeger 1997).
56. See 12 U.S.C. § 1783(a).
57. See id. at § 1775.
58. See GARDNER & MILLS, supra note 33, at 315.
59. See Joseph W. Sinkley, Jr., Level the Playing Field, BANKING STRATEGIES,
July/Aug. 1998, at 6-12.
60. See Federal Credit Union Act §122, 12 U.S.C. §1768 (1998); See also, Phil
Britt The Credit Union Challenge, SAVINGS & COMMUNITY BANKER, Aug. 1994, at 17-
30.
61. See id.
62. See Phil Britt, The Credit Union Challenge, SAVINGS & COMMUNITY BANKER,
Aug. 1994, at 17-30.
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on their savings products, 63 slightly lower rates on their loan products 4
and thus, survive on a more narrow "spread." "Spread" is the difference
between interest income and interest expense.65 It is estimated that non-
tax-exempt institutions would need to earn 40% more than a credit union
to achieve the same level of retained earnings due to this tax advantage.6
Many consumers who are eligible to become credit union members, by
virtue of their employment with a member organization or by residing in
a geographic area served by a credit union, may be attracted to the credit
unions by even a small advantage in the rates they offer over a compet-
ing savings or commercial bank.67 Additionally, fees charged by credit
unions are typically lower than those charged by other institutions.
68
Another advantage that credit unions share is that they typically do
not pay director's fees to members of their board of directors, 9 whereas
in other types of corporations, the director's fee is commonplace and ex-
pected.70 Although this advantage, in comparison to the tax-exempt sav-
ings, is minimal, it contributes to the means by which credit unions re-
main competitive.7'
The potency of the advantages credit unions enjoy as well as the
burdens of the restrictions imposed upon them, make credit unions a
formidable competitor of alternative financial intermediaries. 72 Some
commentators argue that "the playing field should be leveled," and that
credit unions should be made to comply with regulations more akin to
those of commercial and savings banks.73 As Congress, and as many as
63. See Goldwasser, supra note 34, at 62.
64. See id.
65. See GARDNER & MILLS, supra note 33, at 12.
66. See Britt, supra note 62, at 17-30.
67. See Goldwasser, supra note 34, at 62-63.
68. See Survey on Bank Fees Draws Criticism, (visited Mar. 7, 1999) available at
http://www.cuna.orgfdata/ consumer/ advice/ abasurvey.html.
69. See LUDTKE, supra note 16, at 305-08.
70. See Elliott J. Weiss, The Board of Directors, Management, and Corporate
Takeovers: Opportunities and Pitfalls, reprinted in Tim BATTLE FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL: SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS, STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS AND MANAGERIAL
RESPONSIBILITIES, at 36-38 (Arnold W. Sametz ed. 1991).
71. See generally Britt, supra note 62, at 17-30 (discussing, generally, the exis-
tence of limitations on who may become credit union members).
72. See Gilpin, supra note 6, at 1.
73. See Sinkley, supra note 59, at 6.
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70 million members would agree, credit unions are likely to remain an
integral part of our economy.74
III. THE DEBATE OVER CREDIT UNION MEMBERSHIP REQUIREMENTS
Anyone may go down to the local savings or commercial bank of
their choice and open up an account.75 The composition of savings and
commercial banks' depositor base is not regulated or restricted by law.
76
On the other hand, credit unions, by definition, cannot operate in this
manner. 7 They are restricted by law as to whom they can offer member-
ship.
78
Two traditional requirements exist that limit the credit unions' ability
to expand membership.79 Members must either share a common bond
(serving, for example, "persons of a religious, municipal, fraternal, or
community relation")80 or share a geographical common bond (serving a
narrowly defined town or municipality).
These requirements have been interpreted and reinterpreted many
times over the years.8 2 The NCUA has taken a liberal stance in allowing
credit unions to expand their membership.8 3 For example, Communica-
tors Federal Credit Union in Houston has broadened its membership to
"all retirees and senior citizens living within a 25 mile radius of Hous-
ton."84 Other credit unions have expanded the businesses they serve even
though the new additions are unrelated to those the credit union was set
74. See America's Credit Unions, Next Stop Congress, THE EcONOMIST, Feb. 28,
1998, at 78.
75. See generally GARDNER & MILLS, supra note 33, at 295-334 (discussing, com-
paring, and contrasting the products, assets, liabilities, income, and expenses of commer-
cial banks, savings banks, and credit unions).
76. See id.
77. See Federal Credit Union Act § 109, 12 U.S.C. § 1759(a) (1998) (stating the
limitations on who may become credit union members).
78. See Britt, supra note 62, at 17.
79. See 12 U.S.C. § 1759(b)(1998).
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. See generally Foust, supra note 9, at 56-58 (discussing the NCUA's 1982 pol-
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up to serve.85 Still another credit union has offered membership to "any
firm or contractor that has any dealings with the government., 86 This
phenomenal expansion of credit union membership continued throughout
the eighties and nineties.
8 7
Those who compete directly with credit unions, primarily the offi-
cers and directors of smaller commercial and savings banks, argue that
the NCUA's stance on credit union membership has become too liberal
and permissive.88
The banking industry is characterized by keen competition for cus-
tomers' funds, both with other banks and non-bank financial intermedi-
aries such as brokerage houses and insurance companies.8 9 Customers
provide funds for the institutions to engage in profitable lending and in-
vesting activities.90 They also generate significant fee income for the in-
stitution in the form of service charges.
91
The businesses of commercial and savings banks and credit unions
are becoming so much alike,92 that when coupled with the numerous ad-
vantages credit unions enjoy (tax exemption, personalized service, lower
fees, and better rates) and the credit unions' desire to compete more ag-
gressively, a conflict between the competitors was inevitable.93
IV. NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION V. FIRST NATIONAL
BANK & TRUST
The U.S. Supreme Court's first opportunity to address the member-
ship requirement debate in the credit union industry was in National
Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank & Trust.94 Initially,
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. See Caroline Wilson, Credit Union Battle Update, AMERIcA's CoMMuNITY
BANKER, Feb. 1998, at 16-25.
88. See House Votes to Let Credit Unions Expand Membership, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr.
2, 1998, at D5.
89. See COOPER & FRASER, supra note 1, at 29.
90. See generally GARDNER & MILLS, supra note 33, at 317-20 (discussing the as-
set and liability structure of credit unions).
91. See id.
92. See COOPER & FRASER, supra note 1, at 29.
93. See Foust, supra note 9, at 56-58.
94. 118 S.Ct. 927, 927-40 (1998).
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the Court had to decide if the plaintiffs, commercial bankers, had stand-
ing to challenge the actions of the FCUA under Section 10(a) of the Ad-
ministrative Procedures Act.95 Secondly, the Court had to decide if the
NCUA's interpretation of the Federal Credit Union Act, which prompted
the expansion of credit union membership, was legal and proper.
96
In addressing the prudential standing issue, the Court analyzed four
different cases97 involving suits brought by competitors of financial in-
stitutions.98 The Court specifically rejected an inquiry into whether or not
Congressional intent was to benefit the plaintiffs. 99 The standard the
Court adopted to determine standing to sue is that the plaintiff need only
be "arguably within the zone of interests protected."100 Ultimately, the
Court found that the commercial bankers had standing to sue 0 1 in Na-
tional Credit Union Administration, as did the challengers in the cases
the Court used as precedent.
The second, and perhaps more influential issue in National Credit
Union Administration, dealt with the propriety of the NCUA's interpre-
tation of the Federal Credit Union Act.102 The membership issue circu-
lated around the NCUA's allegedly relaxed interpretation of the common
bond requirement as required by the Federal Credit Union Act at that
time.10 3 In effect, the NCUA was permitting credit unions to serve multi-
ple employer groups that were completely unrelated provided that the
members served within each individual group were related. 1 For exam-
ple, in this case, the AT&T Federal Credit Union was permitted to extend
membership to employees of the American Tobacco Company, and
95. See id. at 932-38.
96. See id. at 938-40.
97. See id. at 932-38 (relying on Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Arnold Tours v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970); Clarke v. Secu-





101. See id. at 938.
102. See id.
103. See Sinkley, supra note 59, at 6.
104. See Wilson, supra note 87, at 16-25.
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commercial bankers brought suit claiming they were competitively
harmed by the credit union's expansive membership policy.
10 5
The Court, citing Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,10 6 set forth a framework for evaluating this issue.10 7 The
Court stated that the first inquiry must be: whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise issue at question. If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter; for the Court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Further,
if we determine that Congress has not directly spoken to the precise
question at issue, we then inquire whether the agency's interpretation is
reasonable. 08
The Court reasoned that the "common bond" must exist between all
members of the credit union through occupation and that the "common
bond" requirement interpreted any other way would negate its mean-
ing.109 The Court then noted that the Federal Credit Union Act requires
and intends membership to be limited, and that without the restrictive
interpretation of the common bond requirement, this limitation would not
be achieved. 110
The first segment of the required analysis on this issue remains
uncontested. The matter cannot be easily disposed of because the appli-
cable section of the Federal Credit Union Act, as it existed in 1993, is not
unambiguous."' However, the Court has failed to give sufficient defer-
ence to the NCUA's arguably reasonable policy interpretation. Nor did
the Court, in any way, mention or take note of the various impacts its
decision might have on the credit union industry itself internally and ex-
ternally between the credit unions and their competitors." 2 The Court
105. See National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co., 118 S.Ct.
927, 931-32 (1998).
106. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
107. See First Nat'. Bank, 118 S.Ct. at 938.
108. See id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
109. See id. at 938-40.
110. See id.
111. See Federal Credit Union Act § 109, 12 U.S.C. § 1759 (revised Mar. 1993).
112. See generally First Nat'l. Bank, 118 S.Ct. at 92740 (failing to mention the
possible impact on the credit union industry or consumers).
2000]
NEW YORKLA WSCHOOL LAWREVIEW
merely construed, in a very literal manner, the language of the Federal
Credit Union Act.113
A- Potential Effects of the Court's Ruling
The results of the Court's interpretation could have had potentially
damaging effects on the public and the credit union industry. 14 One
House Representative, Jim Leach, Chairman of the House Banking
Committee commented, "It is inconceivable to me that Congress will
allow millions of Americans to be kicked out of the financial institution
of their choice."' 15 Other commentators speculated that the effect of the
ruling would be less severe, and would only prevent the credit unions
from bringing in new members from unrelated employer groups. 1 6 Yet
others believed that the Court would allow a grandfathering of current
members.1' 7 The fact remains that the Court did not address the mechan-
ics for credit unions to fall into compliance with the ruling."
8
What would have been the impact of the Court's decision in National
Credit Union Administration had Congress not statutorily overruled the
decision? Numerous paths could have been taken by credit unions to fall
into compliance with the decision. 119 Although ranging in severity, the
possible ramifications of any paths chosen by affected credit unions
would potentially cause a tremendous loss in competition among finan-
cial intermediaries, a regulatory and administrative nightmare, and ulti-
mately a detriment to the American public.
20
113. See id.
114. See Foust, supra note 9, at 56-58.
115. Linda Greenhouse, Credit Unions Lose To Banks In High Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 1998, at Dl.
116. See Joan Goldwasser, Is Your Credit Union Safe?, KIPLINGER'S PERSONAL
FINANCE MAGAZINE, Oct. 1996, at 21.
117. See id.
118. See generally First Nat'l. Bank, 118 S.Ct. at 927-40 (affirming the lower
court's decision, which was also silent as to how credit unions should comply).
119. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 87, at 16-25 (suggesting charter conversions to
federal or state mutual thrifts); See, e.g., American Banking Unco-operative, supra note
7, at 99-102 (suggesting the dismantling of credit unions as a solution to the membership
debate); see also Goldwasser, supra note 116, at 21 (suggesting the dismantling of of-
fending credit unions as a possible effect of the Court's ruling).
120. See, e.g., Dean Foust, Cornered Credit Unions Come Out Fighting, BUSINESS
WEEK, Mar. 16, 1998, at 43-45.
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The credit unions could have complied with the ruling by undergoing
a charter conversion to a state or federally chartered mutual savings
bank.121 However, charter conversions are difficult, time-consuming, and
costly to effectuate. 122 Additionally, the NCUA, in recent years, has
made it more difficult for credit unions to convert to mutual thrifts. 
123
Assuming the absence of a grandfathering provision in the Court's
holding, another mechanism to comply would have been for the credit
unions to divest themselves of non-related membership groups. 2a To
effectuate this change, the credit unions would probably have to frag-
ment into smaller, less-diverse institutions serving narrower markets.1 25
However, this fragmentation can cause problems for the institution.
126
Additionally, this approach would be contrary to the general trend in the
financial services industry to combine or consolidate and avoid disinter-
mediation.
127
Hypothetically, this fragmentation would cause the number of credit
unions in America to increase dramatically. 128 As previously mentioned,
the larger the institution, the greater the variety of services it is generally
able to offer to the public.129 The resulting smaller credit unions might
not be able to offer services or rates that would allow it to remain a vi-
able competitor of the unaffected commercial and savings banks. 130 The
121. See Kenneth N. Gilpin, What Now? Piercing the Credit Union Haze, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 1998, at 10.
122. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth Of Competition In The
Dual Banking System, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 677, 684-87 (1988) (mentioning the difficulties
both in obtaining a new bank charter and converting a bank charter).
123. See Wilson, supra note 87, at 16.
124. See Greenhouse, supra note 115, at 1.
125. A logical inference to be drawn is that if credit unions both had to technically
divest themselves of unrelated customer groups yet practically continue to serve them, a
large credit union splitting into numerous distinct institutions to serve each smaller group
would effectively address the fragmentation problem.
126. See Gilpin, supra note 121, at 10.
127. See, e.g., CooPER & FRASER, supra note 1, at 3-4.
128. Hypothetically, if the number of credit unions potentially affected by the
Court's ruling were to choose to comply in this manner, the total number of credit unions
in the United States would increase.
129. See GARDNER & MELLS, supra note 33, at 315-17.
130. See id. (indicating that smaller credit unions generally offer fewer, less-
diverse, and less-sophisticated products).
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result most likely would be an outflow of consumers from the credit un-
ions to these other institutions. 31
Second, serious managerial and administrative problems pertaining
to the structure and/or inter-relatedness of the offspring credit unions
would likely arise among the affected institutions.132 The new institutions
would have to address questions, on a macro level, relating to corporate
governance and financial and regulatory compliance. 33 On a micro level,
they would have to address questions about all aspects of operating pro-
cedure.1 34 These complex and time-consuming questions, coupled with
the costs involved (for example, legal fees, advertising expense, real es-
tate acquisitions for the establishment of new office space, the imple-
mentation of amended charters, by-laws, and operational policies and
procedures; and the acquisition of completely new information handling
systems to name a few) would effectively divert management's attention
from their core businesses causing an amplified effect on the credit un-
ions tenuous competitive stance.
13
Third, the prospective increase in the number of credit unions in ex-
istence, as well as the potential increase in charter conversions, would
impose a hardship upon regulatory authorities who supervise and ap-
prove such activities.1 36 Although an individual credit union's board of
directors is vested with the power by section 1761(b)(1) of the Federal
Credit Union Act to "act upon applications for membership,' '137 any ad-
131. See GART, supra note 3, at 16-19 (suggesting that customers benefit from "a
more complete line of products and services"). The absence of a benefit to consumers
would naturally cause them take their banking business elsewhere.
132. See Gilpin, supra note 121, at 10.
133. See id.
134. See Stanley M. Huggins, Implementing Merger Efficiencies, in
CONSOLIDATION, LIQUIDATION, AND RECAPITALIZATION BANKS FACE THE 90's 349, 376
(Practising Law Institute 1992) (discussing, in the context of a bank integration, the need
to address problems related to operating systems).
135. See id; See generally Paul L. Lee, Merger Conversions of Mutual Savings In-
stitutions, in CONSOLIDATION, LIQUIDATION, AND RECAPITALIZATION BANKS FACE THE
90's 409, 409-45 (Practising Law Institute 1992) (discussing the required actions and
concerns of management when effectuating a bank merger or consolidation).
136. See generally At the Agencies: OTS, THE REGULATORY COMPLIANCE WATCH,
Apr. 21, 1997, at 1-5 (discussing the "burdensome" conversions process faced by mutual
thrifts and the regulator's need to make the process more efficient).
137. Federal Credit Union Act § 113, 12 U.S.C. § 1761b(1) (1998).
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ditions must be approved by the appropriate regulatory agency.
138 Cur-
rently, the NCUA oversees and grants permission for new credit unions
to form.139 Similarly, the Comptroller of the Currency, is responsible for
activities relating to commercial banking,140 and the Federal Home Loan
Bank and appropriate state authorities are responsible for conversions to
savings banks and savings and loans.14 1 Approximately 3,600 credit un-
ions would potentially have been affected by the Court's ruling.142 Ap-
plications to regulatory authorities, in addition to those naturally occur-
ring in the industry, would likely flood regulators' desks and inevitably
cause a delay in the approval process.' 43
Finally, the inconvenience to credit union members and the negative
impact on consumer perception would have a potentially adverse affect
on the industry as a whole. 144 When a financial institution merges with
another, despite management's best efforts, its customers might not be
pleased.145 Customers must not only adjust to new faces in their local
branch, but also to new policies and procedures. 146 This change generally
brings about a feeling of unrest among the customers and the safety,
soundness, and stability of the institution is called into question.147 A
certain uncomfortable period of adjustment is sure to follow.
148
138. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1754 (1998) (The NCUA Board shall investigate and
approve organization certificates).
139. See id. at § 1752.
140. See Lawrence J. White, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR
BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION 26 (Oxford University Press 1991).
141. See id.
142. See Gilpin, supra note 121, at 10.
143. See id.
144. See generally testimony of John P. LaWare, Member, Board of Governors of
The Federal Reserve System, before the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban
Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Sept. 24, 1991, available in CONSOLIDATION,
LIQUIDATION, AND RECAPrrALizATION BANKS FACE THE 90's 713, at 731-39 (Practicing
Law Institute 1992).
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B. The Court Should Have Deferred To The NCUA's Policy
All of these impacts, taken as a whole, beg the question of why the
Supreme Court held as it did in National Credit Union Administration.
Did the Court simply ignore the practical implications of its ruling? The
following discusses how the Court arrived at its decision regarding credit
union membership in National Credit Union Administration and poses
the question of the propriety of its decision.
Using a case the Supreme Court relied upon to find standing, a sub-
stantive argument can be made that the NCUA's policy regarding credit
union membership should have been upheld. In Arnold Tours, Inc. v.
Camp,149 a travel agency brought suit against a commercial bank hoping
to enjoin the bank from offering travel services to the public.150 The
Comptroller of the Currency had ruled that:
Incidental to those powers vested in them under 12 U.S.C. 24,
national banks may provide travel services for their customers
and receive compensation therefor. Such services may include
the sale of trip insurance and the rental of automobiles, as agent
for a local rental service. In connection therewith, national
banks may advertise, develop, and extend such travel services
for the purpose of attracting customers to the bank.
151
The issue in this case centered upon whether the offering of travel
services was truly an incidental power of the bank.152 The Federal Court
of Appeals, on remand, viewed incidental powers as "those which are
directly related to one or another of a national bank's express powers."'
153
The Court would have deferred to the Comptroller's decision had travel
services been found to be incidental. 54
The facts of National Credit Union Administration can be distin-
guished on numerous grounds from those present in Arnold Tours. First,
the policy determination by the NCUA of allowing credit unions to ac-
cept unrelated employment groups for membership was even more re-




153. Arnold Tours v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427, 431 (1972).
154. See id.
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strictive than the one promoted by the Comptroller in Arnold Tours.155
Credit unions were not branching or attempting to branch into unrelated
fields of business.156 The issue solely involved the actions of credit un-
ions within their own industry.157 Secondly, the process of developing
and growing membership is primarily vital, not incidental, to the credit
union's survival. 158 Membership expansion lies at the very core of the
credit unions' ability to thrive and compete.1 59 The decision in Arnold
Tours at least suggests that with regards to express powers, the Court
should be extremely deferential to the agency's determination.
160
Recently, a case 161 decided by the U.S. Supreme Court further em-
phasizes the deferential stance taken in Arnold Tours. In Nationsbank of
North Carolina v. Variable Life and Annuity Co., 162 an insurance com-
pany brought suit to enjoin a national bank from acting as an agent for
the sale of life and annuity products pursuant to permission granted by
the Comptroller of the Currency.163 The Court deferred to the Comptrol-
ler's determination that selling insurance was an incidental power of the
bank.
164
When compared to the actions by banks in both Arnold Tours and
Nationsbank, however, it seems clear that the NCUA's membership pol-
icy is far-less reaching than either banks being permitted to sell insurance
or being prohibited from operating travel agencies. 165 This limitation
would at least serve as one factor to indicate that the Court should have
deferred to the NCUA's interpretation of the Federal Credit Union Act.
155. Compare Nation Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank & Trust
Co., I 18 S.Ct. 927, 927-40, with Arnold Tours, 472 F.2d at 431.
156. See First National Bank, 118 S.Ct at 927-40.
157. See id.
158. See Sinkley, supra note 59, at 6-8.
159. See id.
160. See generally Arnold Tours, 400 U.S. at 45-48.
161. See Nationsbank of North Carolina v. Variable Life and Annuity Co., 513
U.S. 251, 251-64 (1995).
162. 513 U.S. 251.
163. See id. at 255.
164. See id at 257.
165. See generally First National Bank, 118 S.Ct. at 927-40 (allowing credit un-
ions to serve a wider variety of customers, not expanding their product lines or allowing
them to encroach upon the business of competing non-bank companies).
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The U.S. Supreme Court, in National Credit Union Administration,
also relied upon Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.166 and found the NCUA's interpretation to be unreasonable. Using
the framework promulgated in Chevron, the Court states that it must de-
termine the reasonableness of the administrative agency's interpreta-
tion.' 67 In Chevron, the Court had to determine the propriety of regula-
tions passed by the Environmental Protection Agency that pertained to
groupings of pollution-emitting devices. 168 The Court upheld the EPA's
policy stating that, "[a]n agency's interpretation of a statute represents a
reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is enti-
tled to deference where the regulatory scheme is technical and complex,
where the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fash-
ion, and where the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies."'
169
The NCUA's interpretation of the membership provision should
meet this three-part reasonableness standard. First, in National Credit
Union Administration, the issue in question was certainly technical and
complex. 170 Although the superficial question centered solely on the lit-
eral meaning of "membership" and "common bond," the implications of
the Court's decision ran much deeper.17 To reasonably foresee and man-
age the effects of the Court's decision, the technical skill and expertise of
the NCUA would surely be required.
Additionally, there is no evidence that the NCUA adopted its mem-
bership policy in any manner other than a "detailed and reasoned fash-
ion." The NCUA began expansively interpreting the Federal Credit Un-
ion Act in 1982 and continued to do so for the next 16 years. 72 It would
be illogical to believe that, even if the initial decision to allow expansion
in 1982 was ill-reasoned or unwise, the NCUA would continue on this
path for as long as it did. A bad, ineffective, or harmful decision would
166. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
167. See First National Bank, 118 S.Ct. at 938-40.
168. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc, 467 U.S. at 839 (1984).
169. Id. at 865
170. See Arnold Tours, 472 F.2d at 433 (The Court of Appeals in this case deemed
the operation of a travel agency to be "a highly complex activity." Arguably, the opera-
tion and regulation of the entire credit union industry in modem times is at least equally
complex).
171. See First National Bank, 118 S.Ct. at 938-40; see also Gilpin, supra note 121,
at 10.
172. See First National Bank, 118 S.Ct at 934 (emphasis added).
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likely have been reversed long ago. In Smiley v. Citibank, the Court
held, "[t]he mere fact that an agency's interpretation of a statute contra-
dicts a prior agency position is not fatal to a finding that the agency's
interpretation is entitled to deference by the United States Supreme
Court.
17 3
Finally, the NCUA's decision regarding membership required the
agency to reconcile conflicting policies.' 74 The conflict at issue was
whether or not permission to expand should, as a general policy, be
granted. 75 For the NCUA to address this issue, hypothetically they
would have to balance the competing benefits and detriments of allowing
or disapproving membership expansion. Based upon the above analysis,
the NCUA's decision easily and affirmatively slips into the reasonable-
ness framework set forth in Chevron, and therefore should have been
upheld.
Another holding from Chevron supports the proposition that defer-
ence should have been given to the NCUA's policy determination and,
therefore, that the NCUA's decision should have been upheld. 76 In
Chevron, the Court states, "When a challenge to an agency construction
of a statutory problem really centers on the wisdom of the agency's pol-
icy ... the challenge must fail; federal judges have a duty to respect le-
gitimate policy choices made by the political branches.' 77
In National Credit Union Administration, the plaintiff s main argu-
ment (contending that it was unfair of the NCUA to allow credit union to
expand membership), could be seen as attacking the wisdom of the
NCUA's policy. 78 If the membership issue is framed as being purely
substantive and not a matter of statutory interpretation, the issue can
certainly be viewed as questioning the wisdom of the NCUA's policy
decision. In other words, if the litigated issue could be viewed as merely
deciding whether the NCUA's policy decision was good or bad, not per-
missible or impermissible under the Federal Credit Union Act, the Court
arguably would be bound to defer to the NCUA on this matter.
173. Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996).
174. See First National Bank, 118 S.Ct. at 938-40.
175. See id.
176. See 467 U.S. 837, 839.
177. Id.
178. See First National Bank, 118 S.Ct. at 927-40; See also Foust, supra note 9, at
56-58.
2000]
NEW YORKLAWSCHOOL LA WREVIEW
Other recent Supreme Court cases, Marsh v. Oregon National Re-
sources Council and Smiley v. Citibank, provide further support for the
argument that deference should be accorded to an agency's policy deter-
mination. 179 In Marsh, the Court noted that,
[a] federal court's review ... is controlled by the arbitrary and
capricious standard... a factual dispute, the resolution of which
implicates substantial agency expertise; and thus does not in-
volve review of a legal question; because analysis of the relevant
documents requires a high level of technical expertise, deference
must be given to the informed decision of the Corps as the re-
sponsible federal agency.
180
Once again, assuming that the membership issue in National Credit
Union Administration was one of policy, not law, and that there was a
need for particular agency expertise, this language supports the conten-
tion that more deference should have been afforded to the NCUA.
Performing the analysis from another standpoint, the precedential
weight of Chevron, overall, is questionable because the case is distin-
guishable from NCUA. 18' The affected industries in these two cases are
substantially and materially different.18 2 The underlying agency decision
in Chevron was the Environmental Protection Agency's policy regarding
a specific geographic region, 8 3 whereas the NCUA's policy affected the
more pervasive credit union industry. 8 4 Credit unions, as mentioned ear-
lier, exist in all fifty states and currently serve approximately 70 million
179. See generally Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360
(1989) (finding that the Army Corps of Engineers' policy determination that a secondary
environmental impact statement was unnecessary was upheld by the Court because it was
not deemed to be arbitrary or capricious.); See also Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735,
745-47 (1996) (upholding the Comptroller of the Currency's interpretation of the word
"interest" as found in the National Bank Act.).
180. Oregon Natural Res. Def Council, 490 U.S. at 361.
181. Compare Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
467 U.S. 837, 837-66 (1984), with First National Bank, 118 S.Ct. at 927-40.
182. See id.
183. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. at 837-66.
184. See Gilpin, supra note 121, at 10.
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members. 185 The effect of the NCUA's decision had an arguably more
tangible, real effect on the public at large.186
The arguments proposed above, when taken together with a pre-
sumption that Congress intended the administrative agency, not the
Court's, to determine the meaning of ambiguous statutory language; 87
the fact that the Court resorted to a literal, not practical, interpretation of
the FCUA;'88 the Court's deliberate indifference to the NCUA's exper-
tise;189 the speed with which both the House of Representatives and the
Senate acted to overturn the Court's decision;190 and the overwhelming
majority by which they did so, 191 clearly and persuasively indicate that
the Court's holding was wrongly decided.
V. H.R. 1151 & THE AMENDED FEDERAL CREDIT UNION ACT
In response to the Court's decision in National Credit Union Admini-
stration v. First National Bank & Trust, both Houses of Congress en-
acted H.R. 1151 in April of 1998.192 H.R. 1151 clarified, amended, and
expanded in particular, the Federal Credit Union Act's requirements re-
garding credit union membership. 193 As one House Representative stated,
"[i]t stops the bleeding that would have killed the credit union indus-
try.'
194
Before the recent amendment, section 1759 of the Federal Credit
Union Act reads as follows:
185. See Foust, supra note 9, at 56-58.
186. See id.
187. See Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740-41(1996).
188. See generally First National Bank, 118 S.Ct. at 935-40 (discussing the vari-
ous verbal constructs of terms contained within the Federal Credit Union Act).
189. See generally id. at 927-40 (ignoring the NCUA's many years of expertise in
regulating the credit union industry.).
190. See Timeline ofAT&T Case Covers Nearly Eight Years, (visited Mar. 7,
1999) http://www.cuna. org/data/ consumer/advice/timeline.html.
191. See Michael Schroeder, Bill Favoring Credit Unions Clears House, WALL
STREET JOURNAL, Apr. 2, 1998, at 4 (The House of Representatives passed the amended
Federal Credit Union Act in a vote of 411 to 8.).
192. See id.
193. See Federal Credit Union Act § 109, 12 U.S.C. § 1759 (1998).
194. House Votes To Let Credit Unions Expand Their Memberships, N.Y. TIMEs,
Apr. 2, 1998, at D5 (quoting Representative Paul E. Kanjorski).
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Membership - Federal credit union membership shall consist of
the incorporators and such other persons and incorporated or
unincorporated organizations, to the extent permitted by the rules
and regulations prescribed by the Board, as may be elected to
membership and as such each shall subscribe to at least one
share of its stock and pay the initial installment thereon and a
uniform entrance fee if required by the board of directors; except
the Federal credit union membership shall be limited to groups
having a common bond of occupation or association, or to
groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural
district. Shares may be issued in joint tenancy with right of sur-
vivorship with any persons designated by the credit union mem-
ber, but no joint tenant shall be permitted to vote, obtain loans,
or hold office, unless he is within the field of membership and is
a qualified member.
195
The most notable and relevant amendment to the Federal Credit Un-
ion Act is found in section 1759 of the 1998 revised Federal Credit Un-
ion Act. 196 This section expansively addresses single common bond,
197
multiple common bond, 198 and geographic common bond 99 require-
ments. These descriptions which are expanded and clarified, in compari-
son to previous editions of the Federal Credit Union Act, shed light on
Congress' intent regarding membership expansion.200
Congress is taking the middle-road in its new regulation of the in-
dustry.201 The Court's decision, as argued in Section HI(A) of this Note,
would have caused credit union membership to dwindle, while the
NCUA's expansive interpretation of the Federal Credit Union Act would
195. 12 U.S.C. § 1759 (emphasis added).
196. See id.
197. See 12 U.S.C. § 1759(b)(1).
198. See 12 U.S.C. § 1759(b)(2).
199. See 12 U.S.C. § 1759(b)(3).
200. Compare generally Federal Credit Union Act §§ 1751 - 1795 (1998) with
Federal Credit Union Act §§ 1751 - 1795 (1993).
201. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1759 (implementing more stringent regulations of
credit unions' membership than the expansive interpretation previously taken by the
NCUA. However, the revised membership section still allows for greater expansion of
credit union membership than the Court's decision in National Credit Union Administra-
tion would arguably have allowed.).
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potentially allow a great expansion in credit union membership.2 °2 The
Court's restrictive ruling can be viewed as being at one end of the spec-
trum, while the NCUA's permissive interpretation is at the other.203
Multiple common bond membership, which allows a credit union to
serve multiple unrelated groups of members provided they are intra-
related, was at issue is National Credit Union Administration.2°4 Con-
gress imposed a numeric restriction in section 1759(d) of the revised
Act.205 This restriction allows credit unions to accept for membership any
unrelated group of people provided their group is comprised of less than
3,000 members.20 6
This 3,000 member multiple common bond limitation is arguably in-
effectual over time. For example, if fifty 3,000 member groups come
together under one credit union, the net growth to the institution is
150,000 members. This combination would be entirely permissible un-
der the revised provision.20 7 Similarly, if only three 50,000 member
groups band together, an action that would be forbidden by the revised
provision,20 S the net growth to the institution is also 150,000 members.
Given the fact that many more small groups (under 3,000 members) exist
than large ones,20 9 Congress' intent to limit expansion in the industry can
be easily subverted.
The revised Act effectively addresses numerous issues raised by the
Court's ruling in National Credit Union Administration.210 For example,
the divestiture consequence, which would require credit unions to divest
unrelated member groups from their service, as mentioned in the poten-
202. See generally Foust, supra note 9, at 56-58 (discussing the NCUA's 1982
policy change and the effect of it on the credit union industry).
203. See generally Judge Throws Out Changes In Rules For Credit Unions, N.Y.
TnIES, Dec. 5, 1996, at D2 (mentioning the NCUA's 1982 change in credit union mem-
bership policy).
204. See First National Bank, 118 S.Ct at 927-32.
205. See 12 U.S.C. § 1759(d)(1)(1998).
206. See id.
207. See 12 U.S.C. § 1759(d)(1) (Any number of unrelated groups with fewer than
3,000 members may combine and be included in the membership field of a multiple
common-bond credit union.).
208. See id. (This combination of unrelated groups would violate the numeric
limitation because the groups proposed to be included in the multiple common bond
credit union's membership have more than 3,000 members.).
209. See GARDNER & MILLS, supra note 33, at 315-30.
210. See American Banking Unco-operative, supra note 7, at 99-102.
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tial effects section of this Note,211 is effectively nullified. In section
1759(c)(1), existing members of credit unions are permitted to remain
members.
212
The revised Act also addresses the problems hypothetically faced by
affected credit unions fragmenting into smaller institutions.213 The key
distinction between Congress' approach and the Court's approach is that
the process under Congress' amendment is suggested and subject to nu-
merous qualifications, whereas the Court's decision would have arguably
forced the fragmentation upon the unwilling affected institutions.214 Sec-
tion 1759(f)(1)(A) of the revised Federal Credit Union Act calls for the
Board to encourage the formation of smaller credit unions "whenever
practicable and consistent with reasonable standards for the safe and
sound operation of the credit union.'215 This provision has the effect of• • • 216
preserving the competitive ability of smaller institutions. Fragmenta-
tion will occur under the amendment only if the resulting institution can
remain viable.2 17
Another significant amendment to the Act requires the NCUA Board
to evaluate, prior to permitting a credit union to extend its membership to
unrelated groups, a number of criteria to ensure the safety and soundness
of the industry.218 The Board is restricted from approving expansion if:
there is evidence of unsound practices in the subject credit union;219 the
credit union is inadequately capitalized; 220 or the credit union has inade-
quate administrative capabilities to handle the increased work load.221
The Board must also subjectively review and consider the competitive
211. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1759(c)(1); See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1759(d).
212. See 12 U.S.C. § 1759(c)(1).
213. See 142 U.S.C. § 1759(f)(1)(A).
214. See generally National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank &
Trust Co., 118 S.Ct. 927, 927-40 (1998)(stating that credit unions were to comply with
the ruling but not describing how)(emphasis added)
215. 12 U.S.C. § 1759(f)(1)(A).
216. The NCUA will determine that a credit union should fragment to serve a
smaller population only if divesting the credit union of customers would still leave it in a
position of financial and administrative safety and soundness.
217. See 12 U.S.C. § 1759(fJ(1)(A).
218. See 12 U.S.C. § 1759(f)(2).
219. See id.
220. See 12U.S.C. § 1759(f(2)(B).
221. See 12 U.S.C. § 1759(f)(2)(C).
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harm caused to other credit unions.2 22 Congress has granted the NCUA
wide discretion to impose other restrictions as they see fit.
223
These amendments are significant for a number of reasons. First,
they are very protective of the industry itself as a whole, the individual
credit unions, and the public they serve.224 This protective quality ex-
tends to consider the financial, administrative, and competitive ramifica-
tions of proposed membership expansion.225 Second, the NCUA's broad
authority to regulate and oversee the industry on all levels is rein-
forced.226 Even the more solidified provisions of the Act are subject to
Board interpretation. Additionally, the open-ended grant of authority




Credit unions are important players in the American financial sys-
tem.223 Their unique characteristics and approach to providing financial
services certainly distinguishes them from the thousands of other finan-
cial institutions available to the American public.229 Although the last
decade has brought the seemingly innocuous and beneficial credit unions
under constant fire from competitors, the credit union industry as a whole
is growing and probably will continue to do so well into the future.
230
Despite the close-call and potential hardships almost imposed by the
Supreme Court's decision in National Credit Union Administration, the
credit union industry was rescued when Congress revised the Federal
Credit Union Act, effectively overruling the Court's decision.21 Even
222. See 12 U.S.C. § 1759(f)(2)(D).
223. See 12 U.S.C. § 1759(f)(2)(E).
224. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1759(f) (requiring the Board to consider the overall
safety and stability of the credit union industry as well as the safety and stability of the
individual credit unions it regulates).
225. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1759(0(1)(B); See also 14 U.S.C. § 1759(f(l)(C); See
also 12 U.S.C. § 1759(f(1)(D).
226. See 12 U.S.C. § 1752a.
227. See 12 U.S.C. § 1759(f)(2)(E).
228. See Sinldey, supra note 59, at 6-12.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See House Votes to Let Credit Unions Expand Membership, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
2, 1998, at D5.
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though the revised Act places some restraint on the NCUA's power to
regulate the credit union industry, overall, its net effect will likely be
positive.
Credit unions are unlikely to be free and clear just yet. The battle
may be won, but the war is far from over. As time passes, novel attacks
by competitors to the advantages that credit unions, their members, and
Congress hope to protect will certainly become issues to be litigated in
our courts.
Donald Novajovsky
